Under U.S.-China Competition, Taiwan May Be Reduced to Pawn
United Daily News, July 4, 2021
In the communiqué following the Group of 7 (G7) summit on June 13, an unprecedented chapter regarding stability across the Taiwan Strait was included. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration was certainly ecstatic about this, and the United States had obvious intentions to coalesce with its allies on the eve of the centenary of the Chinese Communist Party. As expected, in addition to mentioning the Taiwan issue in his speech on July 1, Chinese President Xi Jinping condemned foreign adversaries for their delusion behind bullying China. They would get themselves “battered and bloodied,” Xi added. The new Cold War situation between the United States and China is taking shape, and Taiwan is really going to be put in pawn in the international power politics.
Since the end of the Cold War, the so-called “Taiwan issue” has generally been managed only by the United States and China. This time around, under the strong maneuver of President Joe Biden in the United States, the Taiwan Strait has suddenly turned into a structural-level issue. Under these circumstances, the situation across the strait is expected to deteriorate over the medium to long term. Taiwan’s economic development is bound to be impacted.
Does Taiwan really want to involve itself in this sensitive structural-level issue? Has the DPP administration thought about how much this might cost? Once Taiwan steps into the minefield amid global power politics, Taiwan's autonomy as a sovereign state will be even downgraded. Unless there is a major conflict, together with high cost, Taiwan would go beyond the point of no return.
The Biden administration was doing no more than avoiding criticism from Congress regarding “softness” on China, especially from Republicans, while aspiring to appear supportive of Taiwan's fight against the mainland. However, such kind of support was a mistake.
The approach taken by the Biden administration is a major disservice to peace and stability in the region in the medium to long term due to the fact that it will definitely affect "strategic reassurance" and "deterrence," two pillars of American policy for stability in the Taiwan Strait.
First, deterrence is only effective under reasonable conditions; once the scope of reasonable conditions is exceeded, deterrence would mean nothing. Since the DPP returned to power in 2016, it has traveled the road to separatism and has been challenging China’s bottom line. Under these circumstances, any international organization or country that uses deterrence to demand stability in the Taiwan Strait would certainly be regarded by Beijing as spawning and supporting Taiwan independence. Whether China resorts to force or not, it will no longer be a matter of reasonable price or not.
Second, the U.S. "strategic reassurance" across the Taiwan Strait was constantly based on its one-China policy of not supporting Taiwan independence, not supporting two Chinas, and not supporting one China, one Taiwan. However, President Biden has gone out of his way to raise the peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait to the level of the G7 communiqué, which has tacitly drifted towards a one-China, one Taiwan situation. The next thing everyone should care about is if Beijing will make a tough response.
In fact, before and after Xi's July 1 anniversary speech on cross-strait issues, the United States has given some thought to the issues, and one of the directions of re-examination is to re-establish a balance of "strategic reassurance" and "deterrence" with China. Perhaps the recent unconfirmed reports of a G20 summit scheduled to be held in October, including a possible meeting between Biden and Xi, will be more or less related to these issues.